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Abstract
The adoption of a common currency in Europe, under the supervision of an independent
European Central Bank, is likely to have had consequences on both the conduct of scal policy
and the incentives to exploit political business cycles in each country. This work proposes a
framework to analyze the inuence of Central Bank Independence (CBI) on opportunistic
political budget cycles before and after Economic and Monetary Union. We rst focus on the
situation before the EMU and present a model of opportunistic budget cycles in the presence
of a central bank with a given level of independence. Secondly, we extend the model to the
situation of the EMU to understand whether small countries take advantage of the fact that
the one central bank setting monetary policy may under react to their own actions, o¤ering
policy-makers leeway to conduct opportunistic expansionary scal policies before elections. In
a monetary union with a common central bank and opportunistic policy-makers the trade-o¤
is between the degree of independence of the central bank and its inattentiveness to the smaller
economies that are members of the monetary union. We present some empirical evidence that
gives some supports to the main ndings of the model by analyzing evidence from twelve
countries of EMU over the period 1980-2012.
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1 Introduction
The idea that politicians manipulate scal policy in order to enhance their prospects of being
reelected has been widely studied and empirically tested. The concept of opportunistic political
business cycle was introduced by Nordhaus (1975) and refers to the inuence that the electoral
manipulation of policy instruments can have on the real economy. However, due to the lack of
empirical evidence in support of a political business cycle in terms of output, recent literature
has focused instead on how scal policy is a¤ected by electoral cycles, i.e. the issue of political
budget cycles (henceforth PBC). Several studies support the existence of political budget cycles
worldwide and also within the European Union and Economic and Monetary Union in Europe,
namely Efthyvoulou (2012), Buti and Van der Noord (2003), Von Hagen (2003) and Mink and De
Haan (2006). However, most of this literature is entirely empirical in nature and does not explore
the relationship between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and opportunistic PBCs.
This work examines the inuence of CBI on opportunistic political budget cycles at both a
theoretical and an empirical level. We construct a model inspired in the setting of Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) to capture the interplay between a shift of the level of Central
Bank Independence on how the scal policy is set at the country level, before electoral periods.
Firstly, we focus on the situation before the EMU and we present a model of opportunistic budget
cycles with an independent central bank. The aim of the model is to understand what is driving
political budget cycles in the presence of a central bank with varying degrees of independence.
In the second part, we extend the model to the setting of a monetary union, as in EMU, where
monetary and scal policies are determined by two distinct authorities: a common central bank
that sets monetary policy responding to the economic situation of the union as a whole, and an
incumbent politician in a small country choosing scal policy in an election year. The key idea
of this second model is to determine whether and how small countries in the union might take
advantage of the fact that the central bank may overlook the specic economic conditions of the
small country, thus conducting opportunistic expansionary scal policies in electoral periods.
To support empirically the main ndings of our models, we examine twelve countries of EMU
over the period 1980 to 2012. Using the general government budget balance as the scal policy
indicator, we nd empirical evidence of opportunistic PBCs, particularly after the countries have
joined EMU. We also conclude that central bank independence inuences positively scal policy
- encouraging surpluses - as predicted in the theoretical model. In addition, we obtain that Ger-
many´s economic cycle plays a crucial role in individual country budget balances only after the
adoption of the common currency. Also, the smaller the size of a country´s economy relative to
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that of Germany, the larger partner in the monetary union, the more scal policy-makers tend to
indulge in budget decits. We interpret our results as suggestive of the line of research and the
model options proposed in this thesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey review the literature on political
business cycles, previous empirical results about PBCs and central bank independence. In section
3 we present two models about the inuence of central bank independence on political budget
cycles. The rst focuses on the case of one country with its own central bank, the second focuses
on the case of the EMU, i.e. several countries and only one central bank that sets monetary policy.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence of political budget cycles in twelve countries of the EMU.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 The Theory of Political Business Cycles
Political Business Cycle (PBC) models can be dened as models where business cycles are derived
from political decisions by self-interested politicians that are either opportunistic - focused on
getting reelected - or display a conict over macroeconomic goals ination versus unemployment,
di¤erent types of public spending, etc. The main purpose of the political business cycle literature
is to study the e¤ects of the political incentives above on the real economy, namely on GDP and
unemployment. In other words, whether government policy choices, scal or monetary, driven
by political incentives have an impact on the real economy. Within the literature of the PBCs
we can distinguish a more specic literature on political budget cycles, studying the political
incentives a¤ecting governments scal policy decisions. Due to the lack of empirical evidence
Political Business Cycles (Shi and Svensson, 2003) the literature has experienced a shift from the
broader study of the real e¤ects to the study of the political budget cycles.
As suggested above, PBC models can be divided in two main groups. On the one hand, we
have opportunistic PBCs, where the business cycle results from the manipulation of policy tools
by incumbent politicians  irrespective of policy preferences - to stimulate the economy before
an election, and improve their chances of reelection. On the other hand, in partisan PBCs the
business cycle results from the successive elections of administrations of di¤erent political parties
with di¤erent preferences over ination and unemployment, composition of public spending, or
other.
Partisan PBC models are characterized by di¤erent parties with di¤erent preferences regarding
economic issues and, therefore, di¤erent macroeconomic policy choices. Hibbs (1977) introduced
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the partisan PBCs by examining postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies associated with left-
and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. He argued that these two types of govern-
ment systematically di¤ered in their perception of the relative costs of ination and unemployment:
right-wing government being more sensitive to the cost of ination, and left-wing cabinets to the
cost of unemployment. The major criticism to Hibbs´ was its anchor in an exploitable Phillips
Curve, where expectations are not rational. Rational expectations were introduced into the par-
tisan PBC models in Alesina (1987) emphasizing the role of policy uncertainty when we have
two potential policymakers that can be elected, each with di¤erent policy preferences. The main
conclusion was that, in the presence of price or wage stickiness, uncertainty about electoral out-
comes can drive a political business cycle even with rational expectations. Although Alesina (1987)
assumed an exogenous electoral resultsprobability, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) extended the
setup to a more general model where both the electoral result and the partisan cycle are taken as
endogenous, with no consequences for the results.
Opportunistic PBC models were rst introduced by Nordhaus (1975). They are characterized
by a politician concerned only with winning the elections and holding o¢ ce as long as possible.
In the Nordhaus model, an incumbent facing a reelection directly controls ination and is willing
to distort policy in order to enhance her probability of winning. Voters are assumed to like
growth, dislike ination and unemployment, and are inuenced by the economic performance in
the period immediately before the election. Expectations of ination are adaptive and not rational.
As the incumbent moves to maximize his probability of staying in o¢ ce through the control of
monetary policy, in equilibrium she will stimulate the economy before the election via expansionary
monetary policy. After the election, the need to bring down high ination expectations makes the
politician incur in contractionary monetary policy, leading to a post-electoral period of recession.
The Nordhaus model was also criticized due to its reliance on political business cycles driven by
non-rational voters, who are short-sighted in two dimensions: they have adaptive expectations
about ination and their voting behavior depends only on the incumbent past performance. In
Nordhaus (1975), by the time of the new election voters have already forgotten the past recession
and its causes, and respond only remembering the current boom that anticipates this next election.
The application of game theory to macroeconomics brought a reformulation of the opportunistic
political business cycles models by incorporating a rational expectations framework. Several ad-
verse selection-type of PBC models1 were developed. Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), Rogo¤ (1990) and
Persson and Tabellini (1990) are the leading examples of this type of PBC models. Now, incumbent
politicians and voters share the same utility function - i.e. both have exactly the same preferences
1Shi and Svensson (2003) use this designation that but in the context of political budget cycles.
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regarding ination, unemployment and government spending. In addition, all the models are also
opportunistic in the sense the politician wants to win the elections, her welfare is increased by
being in o¢ ce and her goals do not have a partisan motivation. The main innovation of these ad-
verse selection-type of opportunistic PBC models is their driving force: information asymmetries
regarding the competence of the incumbent. That is, di¤erent politicians are assumed to have
di¤erent degrees of competency and the politician has more information about her own degree of
competency than the voters. These models of competence were introduced by Rogo¤ and Sibert
(1988) and Rogo¤ (1990) in the context of political budget cycles, where it is assumed that more
competent incumbents use scal revenues more e¢ ciently by providing more public goods. Persson
and Tabellini (1990) present a constructive extension to the political business cycles literature by
considering that more competent incumbent politicians are able to achieve higher growth with
lower unexpected ination. In these models, pre-electoral manipulations of policy instruments are
used by the incumbent politician as a signal of competence.
2.2 Empirical Evidence of PBCs
The rst empirical studies on Political Business Cycles were focused on the United States. Tufte
(1978) nds evidence of pre-electoral scal policy manipulation, through government transfers.
Over time this work has been extended to other countries. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1992)
study evidence of PBC models in 18 OECD economies from 1960 to 1987 using both the Nordhaus
approach and the rational approach of Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988). They nd very little evidence of
pre-electoral e¤ects on the economic activity, namely on GDP growth and unemployment. However,
they observe some evidence of expansionary monetary policy in election years and of expansionary
scal policy prior to elections - evidence they emphasized as being signicant though not extremely
strong and interpreted as the politiciansconcern about that their reputation which constrains the
frequency of pre-electoral manipulation of the economic policy. Moreover, these authors noticed
that ination exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be due both to pre-electoral scal or
monetary expansions and to an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or
indirect taxes.
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) nd evidence to support partisan but not opportunistic
business cycles in the United States, between the years of 1947 and 1994. They observed regular
di¤erences between Democratic and Republican administrations with respect to growth rates,
average ination rates, and the unemployment rate, consistent with the predictions of rational
partisan theory. On the other hand, the authors do not nd evidence of expansionary monetary
policy during election years or pre-electoral manipulation of scal policy. The exception is the year
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1972, of the well-know reelection of Richard Nixon as president of the US, many times mentioned
as a prototypical example of the Nordhaus model at work. In this work, the authors also study
18 OECD countries in the period between 1960 and 1993 and obtain similar results to those for
the United States, i.e. they nd evidence supportive of the rational partisan model, particularly
in countries with a two-party political system, and again no evidence to support opportunistic
models.
As previously mentioned, the literature on political business cycles has recently focused on scal
instruments rather than on outcome variables such as growth, ination or unemployment. Persson
and Tabellini (2002) investigate whether scal policy variables, such as total spending, revenue,
decits and welfare-state spending, exhibit electoral cycles and whether these cycles are a¤ected
by the political regime in place. These authors analyze 60 democracies over the period 1960-98 to
nd that, independently of the political regime, taxes are cut before elections, painful scal adjust-
ments are postponed until after the elections, and that there is no electoral cycle on welfare-state
spending. They also conclude that all types of governments tend to conduct pre-electoral tax cuts,
while presidential democracies are alone in making post-election scal adjustments. Another inter-
esting conclusion was that spending cuts before elections are associated to majoritarian electoral
systems, whereas expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections are associated with
proportional electoral systems. Another relevant study is that by Shi and Svensson (2006), which
presents evidence of political budget cycles for a large panel data set comprising 85 countries over
the period 1975 to 1995. The authors nd that government scal decits increase by one percent of
GDP, on average, in election years. However, these budget cycles are large in developing countries
and small or nonexistent in developed countries.
Another growing strand of the literature focuses on evidence of political budget cycles in de-
veloping countries. In a brief review, it was found evidence of PBCs namely in Mexico (Gonzalez,
2002), India (Khemani, 2004), and in 44 Sub-Saharan African countries (Block, 2002). Further-
more, Brender and Drazen (2005a, 2007) demonstrate that in established democracies voters should
punish politicians conducting opportunistic scal policies during elections and, therefore, there
should exist political budget cycles only in new democracies. These ndings suggest that scal
manipulation may have good results in new democracies due to the lack of voter sophistica-
tion, that is, lack of experience with electoral politics or lack of information that is available in
established democracies and used by experienced voters. Hence, as showed by Brender (2003),
voters will reward conservative scal policies as they become more sophisticated and informed, i.e.
they will become more scal conservatives. However, Brender and Drazen (2005b) use a large
cross-section of countries to test whether good economic conditions or expansionary scal policy
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help incumbents to be reelected and nd no evidence that an increase in scal decits enhance the
politicians reelection prospects, even in new democracies. In the same line, Arvate, Avelino and
Tavares (2009) test how voter sophisticationrelates with scal conservativenessusing electoral
data from Brazil between 1990 and 2002, a period in which this country could be considered a new
democracy. These authors use schooling years as a proxy for voters sophistication - so that
voters with less years of education are considered naïve- and nd no evidence that voters, so-
phisticatedor naïve, reward decits at the polls. In addition, they nd that high raked states
in schooling years actually seem to reward scal surpluses. These ndings complement Brender
and Drazen (2005b) by suggesting the use of proxies for voter sophistication and analyzing how a
change in institutional environment a¤ects perceptions of scal policy and voter behavior.
On the other hand, recent studies support the existence of PBCs in established democracies.
For example, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) study OECD countries between 1970 and 2002 and nd
evidence supportive of PBCs. Alt and Lassen (2006) study how scal transparency and political
polarization inuences the existence of political budget cycles. Their analysis of 19 OECD countries
in the 1990s shows that in countries with lower transparency there are clear signs of electoral cycles,
whereas in countries with higher transparency there is no evidence of cycles. They also nd that
cycles are larger in countries with more political polarization.
As to the study of political cycles in the European Union (EU) and, more specically, the
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, several studies nd evidence of its existence. Buti
and Van der Noord (2003) examined EMU countries over the period 1999-2002 and concluded
that the electoral budget cycle is alive and well in EMU. These authors demonstrate that the
budgetary discipline requirements of the Stability Growth Pact (SGP) are not su¢ cient to restrain
opportunistic expansionary pre-electoral scal policies, that is, the costs of breaking the scal
rules are smaller than the short-term gains of indulging in higher decits. Von Hagen (2003) also
analyzed the scal behavior of EMU countries and reached a similar conclusion: governments use
scal policy as an instrument to support their electoral interests. Finally, a more recent study by
Mink and De Haan (2006) examines countries in the euro area during the period of 1999-2004 to
nd strong evidence of expansionary scal policies in years prior to elections, indicating that the
SGP had made the politicians to curb electoral manipulation of scal instruments.
2.3 Central Bank Independence
Central bank independence can be dened as the inverse of the degree of inuence the government
has over the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. a measure of how autonomous is the central bank.
According to Hasse (1990) central bank independence can be measured in three main areas where
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the inuence of government should be prohibited or signicantly reduced: personnel independence -
the inuence the government has in the governing body of the central bank; nancial independence -
the ability of the government to nance its expenditures through central-bank credits; and, nally,
policy independence  the autonomy of the central bank to determine the monetary policy. In
what concerns policy independence, it is also important to distinguish independence with respect
to goals and to instruments (Debelle and Fischer, 1994; Fischer, 1995). The former relates to the
autonomy of the central bank to follow his own objectives, and the latter refers to the room of
maneuvering that the central bank has in deciding how to achieve its goals.
A common argument regarding central bank independence is that countries with independent
central banks present lower levels of ination than countries where the government directly controls
the monetary policy. In the literature there were put forward three main explanations for this fact
(Eij¢ nger and De Haan, 1996), based on public-choice arguments, on the relationship between scal
and monetary authorities, and on the issue of time-inconsistency. The rst refers to the strong
political pressures that can be exerted on the monetary policy to comply with the politicians wills.
This argument is closely related with the partisan and opportunistic theories described above, i.e.
political business cycles driven by monetary policy. Generally, a more independent central bank
will not succumb as much to these political pressures. The arguments based on the relationship
between scal and monetary policy were introduced by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and state
that more independent central banks will not nance scal decits by creating money. Finally,
the most important arguments are based on the time-inconsistency problem, as in Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983), and are centered on the general
debate of rules versus discretion. Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue that discretionary monetary
policies can lead to ine¢ ciently high ination. They argue that when expected ination low,
the marginal cost of additional ination is low and consequently expansionary policies will be
conducted in order to raise output above its normal level. However, if agents are rational they
know that policymaker have this incentive and, therefore, they will not expect low ination. Hence,
if policymakers pursue discretionary policies there would be ination without any increase in
output. Similarly, Barro and Gordon (1983) state that when monetary policy can be anticipated
the rate of unemployment can be reduced but the government would not be able to commit
to low ination and, therefore, ination would be sub-optimally high. Several solutions were
o¤ered to solve the time- inconsistency problem, namely through the delegation to a conservative
central banker (Rogo¤, 1985) or to an independent policymaker with suitable incentives and a well-
specied mandate - the contractingapproach to central banking (Persson and Tabellini, 1993;
Walsh, 1995). Another solution to address the time-inconsistency of problem is the reputation
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approach which was formally introduced by Backus and Dri¢ ll (1985) and Barro (1986). This
approach is based on the public uncertainty regarding the policy preferences of the central bank.
Under this uncertainty, what determines the publics expectations of ination is the central bank
behavior and so the lower is the ination observed today, the lower are publics expectations
of ination in the following periods. This solves the time-inconsistency problem by giving the
central incentives to pursue low-ination policies. Lastly, the adoption of a credible currency
is also considered an e¢ cient way to overcome the time-inconsistency problem. The issue of
optimal currency areas was rst studied by Mundell (1961) and is pointed out as the result of two
countervailing forces: the benets in facilitating trade in goods, services and nancial transaction,
and the loss of independent monetary policy that cannot be tailored to each countrys disturbances.
Alesina and Barro (2002) extend Mundells framework and incorporate it in the discussion of
rules versus discretion in monetary policy by considering that adhering to a currency union can
commit a country to monetary stability, which is especially attractive to countries that lack internal
discipline. In other words, the authors show that the adoption of the currency of a low-ination
anchor can solve the time-inconsistency problem by the gain credibility and consequent reduction
of undesired ination.
In theoretical models, central bank independence is frequently represented by the weight central
bank preferences give to price stability over output. A central bank is considered conservative when
it places a higher weight on ination than the politicians or the public (Rogo¤, 1985). The idea
is that independent central banks follow a policy of low and stable ination that is not usually
the preferred by incumbent politicians. In Rogo¤ (1985), the central banker cares relatively more
about ination and less about output than society, and the main conclusion is that it would be
socially optimal to have the conservative central banker setting the monetary policy.
2.4 Central Bank Independence and Political Business Cycles
In the presence of an independent central bank the political business cycles cannot be driven by
monetary policy since it is not controlled by the incumbent politicians. Alesina and Gatti (1995)
study the e¤ect of central bank independence on partisan political business cycles, by extending
the rational partisan model of Alesina (1987). The authors introduce output shocks and the
possibility of delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank that cares more about
price stability, i.e. conservative. The main idea is that the political uncertainty that is driven the
output uctuations in Alesina (1987) can be eliminated by delegating the monetary policy to an
independent central banker before the election who cannot be removed from o¢ ce. Hence, the
delegation to an independent central bank has the advantage of eliminating the ination bias and
9
the policy uncertainty and consequently bringing down the variance of ination and output.
In Rogo¤ (1985) the delegation to an independent and ination-averse central banker reduces
the average ination at the cost of higher output variability. Conversely, in Alesina and Gatti (1995)
by delegating to an independent central bank the monetary policy is insulated from the partisan
cycles and, therefore, the politically induced variance in output is eliminated. This allows the
economy to achieve simultaneously lower ination and output stabilization when an independent
central bank reduces political variability via a monetary policy insulated from political pressures.
3 Model: Electoral Opportunism and Fiscal Policy Before
and After the EMU
3.1 Benchmark Model One Country One Central Bank
Here we present a one country model of opportunistic budget cycles in the presence of a central
bank with varying degrees of independence. The main aim of this model is to understand what
drives these political budget cycles under the inuence of a central bank which decides monetary
policy.
Monetary and the scal policies are determined by two distinct authorities: a central bank sets
monetary policy, and an incumbent politician decides over scal policy. The incumbent politician
faces an election and wants to remain in o¢ ce. This is an opportunistic two period model: in
the rst period the incumbent is facing an election and wants to use scal policy to enhance his
probability of reelection; in the second period, after election, the politician may remain in o¢ ce or
become a regular citizen.
The model is an extension of a simplied version of the conservativeness model of Rogo¤
(1985), adding shocks to an opportunistic political business cycles framework. On the one hand,
as in Rogo¤ (1985), we have a central banker who is more ination-averse than the incumbent
politician. On the other hand, this is an opportunistic model as the politician cares about winning
the election since his welfare increases by being in o¢ ce.
We present next how the monetary and scal policies are formulated.
3.1.1 The Monetary Authority - Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
The monetary policy is determined by a central banker that has discretion over the choice of
ination. The utility of the central bank is given by the following expression:
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UCB = ctyt   
2t
2
(1)
where: t is a random variable with mean t and variance 
2
 ; yt is the level of output; t is the
level of ination;  is the weight of ination relative to output; and 0 < c < 1 denes the degree
of "conservativeness" of the central bank - a more "conservative" central bank has a low c, that is,
she cares relatively more about curbing ination.
Moreover, it is assumed that expectations of ination are determined before t is realized.
The aggregate supply is given by:
yst =  (t   et ) (2)
where: yt is the level of output; t is the level of ination; et the expected level of ination;
and  the elasticity of output with respect to deviations of ination from its expected level.
The intuition behind this condition is given by the work of Lucas (1972) and Phelps (1970)
on the microeconomic foundations of employment and ination. This condition is also denoted
by Lucas "surprise" supply function and is based on the Lucas Imperfect-Information model. In
this model, producers do not observe the aggregate price level and, consequently, their production
decisions are made without knowing the relative prices of their goods. In other words, when the
price of the product changes, the producer cannot distinguish if it reects a change in the goods
relative price or a change in the aggregate price level. However, a change in the relative price
inuences the optimal amount to produce, contrarily to a change in the aggregate price level.
When the price of the producers good increases it can reect a rise in the goods relative price
or in the price level, then the rational response for the producer is to attribute part of the change
to an increase in the relative price and part to an increase in the price level, and so to increase
the output to some extent. Therefore, the aggregate supply is a¤ected positively by an increase in
the aggregate price level because all producers see an increase in the price of their goods and, not
knowing the cause, will always raise their output. For this reason, the Lucas supply function states
that the deviation of output from its normal level (which in the model is zero) is an increasing
function of the surprise in the price level.
The central bank chooses  that maximizes its utility function subject to the aggregate supply
relation:
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t
ctyt   
2t
2
(3)
s:t: yst =  (t   et ) (4)
Solving this problem2 we obtain the optimal level of ination for the central bank:
t =
c

t (5)
This expression tells us that the optimal level of ination depends positively on the shock
t and on the value of c. Thus, higher levels of ination are optimal for a less independent (or
conservative) central bank, represented by a higher value of c.
3.1.2 The Politician - Optimal Fiscal Policy and the Optimal Level of Debt
Utility The incumbent politician is assumed to care about the social welfare of the voter and
about being in o¢ ce. This latter characteristic is what makes this model an opportunistic political
budget cycle model as electoral motivations a¤ect the formulation of the optimal scal policy, in a
way that is independent of ideology.
The social welfare of the voters, uV , depends on the general state of the economy, i.e. voters
like growth and dislike ination:
uVt = tyt   
2t
2
(6)
The welfare of the voters is given by a similar expression to the one of the central bank.
However, the main di¤erence is the on the value of c, which is in this case is assumed to be equal
to 1, implying that voters place more weight on output than the central bank.
It is also assumed that the politicians welfare increases when she is in o¢ ce and the extra
welfare is represented by the parameter  > 0: Since being in o¢ ce as the chief administrator is
considered a great honor, Rogo¤ (1990) denote these benets as "ego rents". However, this extra
welfare might be also inuenced by corrupt motives, such as receiving bribes or future jobs in
private sector.
In the rst period, at t = 1, the politician is in o¢ ce and is facing an election. Hence, her
utility is given by:
2See algebra in section 1.1 of Appendix I.
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UPE1 = u
V
1 +  (7)
= 1y1   
21
2
+  (8)
In words, the utility of the politician elected in the rst period, UPE1 , is equal to the utility of
voters in that period, uV1 , plus the benets of holding o¢ ce, .
In the second period, t = 2 , after the elections, two possible situations can occur:
i) The politician is reelected and her utility is given by:
UPE2 = u
V
2 +  (9)
= 2y2   
22
2
+  (10)
ii) The politician is not reelected his utility is given by:
UPNE2 = u
V
2 (11)
= 2y2   
22
2
(12)
The utility of the politician non-elected in the second period, UPNE2 , is exactly equal to the
utility of the voters in that period, uV2 . The intuition behind this condition is given by the fact
that for the politician not being elected means to become a regular voter again and so not being
able to benet from the advantages of holding o¢ ce.
It is assumed that the incumbent politician will be reelected with a probability p, which depends
positively on the output in the election year, y1:
@p(y1)
@y1
> 0 (13)
This assumption is supported by numerous studies in the literature that nd empirical evidence
for the hypothesis that good economic conditions in the year of election enhance the politicians
prospects of reelection. Kramer (1971) Tufte (1975) and Fair (1978) [updated in Fair (1982, 1988)]
studied the case of the United States and concluded that aggregate economic conditions before an
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election, specically per capita output or income growth, have a signicant e¤ect on voting patterns
- for example, Fair (1978) found that a 1% raise in the growth rate increases the incumbents vote
total by about 1%. Several other articles nd similar results in both the United States and other
countries, namely Lewis-Beck (1988) found these results holding in Britain, France, West Germany,
Italy, and Spain, and Madsen (1980) in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
Therefore, the intertemporal utility of the politician is given by:
UP = UPE1 + E1

p(y1)U
PE
2 + [1  p(y1)]UPNE2
	
(14)
Or equivalently:
UP = 1y1   
21
2
+ + E1

2y2   
22
2
+ p(y1)

(15)
where:
 is the discount factor, with 0 <  < 1
Aggregate Demand The aggregate demand is assumed to be given by:
ydt = mgt (16)
where gt represents government expenditures and m is the scal multiplier which we assume
to be positive, m > 0. This last assumption is based on the work of Spilimbergo, Symansky and
Schindler (2009) where is presented a complete survey of scal multipliers in the literature and
estimates of multipliers for numerous countries. Regarding the issue of which scal multiplier to
use in specic applications, the authors state that the rule of thumb is a multiplier of 1.5 to 1
for spending multipliers in large countries, 1 to 0.5 for medium sized countries, and 0.5 or less for
small open countries.
Budget Constraint The politician determines the level of public expenditure g each period by
choosing the level of debt d. Considering that this is a two-period model, it is assumed that the
politician can only contract debt in the rst period and it must be fully repaid (with interest) in
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the next period. Hence, the level of public expenditure each period is given by:
g1 =W + d (17)
g2 =W   (1 + il)d (18)
where W is the government endowment, consisting of xed tax receipts, and il is the long-term
interest rate on debt. For simplicity, we will assume that government endowment is zero, W = 0,
so that:
g1 = d (19)
g2 =  (1 + il)d (20)
Since in rst period the politician is facing a reelection, she has greater incentives to issue
a substantially high level of debt in order to improve the economic conditions and, therefore,
enhance her prospects of being reelected. However, the requirement to fully repay any debt issued
if reelected inhibits the politician to engage in an abnormal expansionary scal policy during the
election year. Thus, when deciding the optimal amount of debt, the politician faces a trade-o¤
between the improvement of her reelection probability and a more painful obligation to pay.
Optimal Fiscal Policy and Level of Debt The politicians only scal policy instrument is
the level of debt, thus the optimal scal policy during the election year is determined by choosing
how much debt, d, to issue. And for this decision she must take into account the trade-o¤ between
the enhancement of her reelection prospects and a more painful obligation to meet. Hence, the
incumbent politicians problem is given by the maximization of her intertemporal utility with
respect to d subject to the aggregate supply, aggregate demand and budget constraint, of both
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period one and period two:
max
d
UP = 1y1   
21
2
+ + E1

2y2   
22
2
+ p(y1)

(21)
s.t. 1 =
1

ys1 + 
e
1 (22)
2 =
1

ys2 + 
e
2 (23)
yd1 = mg1 (24)
yd2 = mg2 (25)
g1 = d (26)
g2 =  (1 + il)d (27)
Solving this problem, in equilibrium, we obtain3 :
d = d
@p(y1)
@y1
+ d1   d


e1   d2 + d


e2 (28)
where:
d =
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
> 0 and (29)
 = (1 + il) (30)
d consists of only exogenous parameters of the model and has always a positive sign. Moreover,
given the parameters that it comprises, d can be considered as a kind of "discount factor" in this
expression.
The only endogenous parameters in the expression above of the optimal level of debt are the
levels of expected ination in the rst and second period, which are determined by the optimal
monetary policy. And, in the model, the central bank sets monetary policy by choosing the optimal
level of ination. Hence, assuming rational expectations, the expected level of ination each period
is given by:
et = E [t] = E

ct


=
c

E [t] =
c

t (31)
By substituting the respective values into the last expression, we obtain the optimal level of
debt:
d = d
@p(y1)
@y1
+ d (1   c1)  d (1  c) 2 (32)
3See algebra in section 2.1 of Appendix I
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Comparative Statics In order to better understand what determines the scal policy in an
election year, we proceed to the analysis of how the optimal level of debt responds to changes in:
i) the sensibility of the probability of reelection with respect to output:
@d
@
h
@p(y1)
@y1
i = 2
m (1 + (1 + il))
 > 0 (33)
The higher is the sensibility of the probability of reelection with respect to output the higher will
be the level of debt. Thus, if the probability of reelection reacts more to the economic conditions,
the politician will be more tempted to increase debt in order to enhance his prospects of being
reelected. Moreover, this e¤ect is stronger the more the politicians utility improves by being in
o¢ ce, i.e. for higher values of . This condition supports the existence of opportunistic budget
cycles in our model.
ii) the additional utility the politician derives from being in o¢ ce is:
@d
@
=
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
@p(y1)
@y1
> 0 (34)
The higher is the extra welfare that the politician gets from being in o¢ ce the higher will be
the level of debt. This is also an important condition for our model, since we can conclude that
the political budget cycles will be more pronounced the more the politician benets from being in
o¢ ce.
iii) Shock in the rst period:
@d
@1
=
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
> 0 (35)
The intuition behind this condition is given by the role of the shock in the rst period, 1, in
the politicians intertemporal utility function. Since 1 represents the impact of output in the rst
period on the intertemporal utility function, a higher value augments the politicians incentives to
engage in expansionary scal policies during the election year.
iv) Mean of the shock:
a) in the rst period:
@d
@1
=   
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
c < 0 (36)
An increase in 1 implies, for a given c, an increase of expected ination in the rst period and
a consequent reduction of the politicians intertemporal utility. However, this e¤ect is attenuated
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by having a more conservative (or independent) central bank that keeps ination lower on average.
Thus, it will be optimal for the politician to contract a lower level of debt so that the negative
impact of 1on her intertemporal utility is not amplied by further inationary pressures.
b) in the second period:
@d
@2
=   
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
 (1  c) (37)
@d
@2
< 0 since c < 1 (38)
There are two main factors behind the intuition of this condition. An increase in 2 implies
a loss in the politicians intertemporal utility function both through the impact of y2 and e2.
Whether the politician attenuates this loss by engaging in contractionary or expansionary scal
policies depends on which of these two e¤ects is stronger. The e¤ect via expected ination is
attenuated by having a more conservative (or independent) central bank that keeps ination lower
on average. Thus, the impact of a recession in the second period is necessarily stronger and so it
is optimal for the politician to contract a lower level of debt as a response to an increase in 2.
v) the degree of central bank independence (or conservativeness):
@d
@c
=   
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
1 +
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
2 (39)
=
2
m (1 + (1 + il))
(2   1) (40)
@d
@c
> 0 i¤ 2 > 1 (41)
A lower level of central bank independence implies higher levels of expected ination in both pe-
riods. Thus, the politicians decision about following expansionary or contractionary scal policies
depends on her expectations of whether ination will be higher in the rst or the second period. If
the politician expects higher ination in the rst period then she will contract a lower level of debt
in order to avoid any further inationary pressures, while if the expectation of ination is higher in
the second period she will engage in expansionary policies to counterbalance the negative impact
of ination on her intertemporal utility. And, for a given value of c, expectations about ination
depend on the mean of the shocks, i.e. expected ination is higher in the second period if and only
if the mean of shock in the second period is higher than mean of the shock in the rst period, and
vice-versa.
We study conditions iv) and v) in further detail in section 3.3.
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vi) the scal multiplier:
@d
@m
=   
2
m2 (1 + (1 + il))


@p(y1)
@y1
+ (1   c1)  (1  c) 2

(42)
=   1
m
d (43)
@d
@m
< 0 i¤ d > 0 (44)
The intuition of this condition is given by the relationship between the scal multiplier and
the politicians intertemporal utility. Having a higher scal multiplier implies a greater impact
of a change in the level of debt on the level of output. Hence, with a higher value of m it will
be optimal for the politician to follow a not so expansionary scal policy, since an increase debt
implies now a stronger improvement of her intertemporal utility.
vii) the elasticity of output with respect to deviations of ination from its expected level:
@d
@
=
2
m (1 + (1 + il))


@p(y1)
@y1
+ (1   c1)  (1  c) 2

(45)
In this case, the sigh of @d@ is ambiguous because it depends on the interaction between the
political factors, the shocks and the expected shocks accommodated by the central bank.
viii) the discount factor:
@d
@
=
2
m (1 + (1 + il)2)
2

@p(y1)
@y1
  (1 + il)2 (1   c1)  (1  c) (1 + il)2

(46)
Once again, the sigh of @d@ is ambiguous because it depends on the interaction between the
political factors, the shocks, the expected shocks accommodated by the central bank and the
interest rate paid on debt.
ix) the long-term interest rate:
@d
@il
=   2(1 + i
l)2
m (1 + (1 + il))
2


@p(y1)
@y1
+ (1   c1) +

1  
2

(1  c) 2

(47)
The sigh of @d
@il
is also ambiguous, depending once again on the interaction between the political
factors, the shocks, the expected shocks accommodated by the central bank and the discount factor
.
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3.2 Opportunistic Budget Cycles in the European Monetary Union
We now extend the model to the situation of the EMU where we have an independent central bank
that sets monetary policy, taking into account the economic situation of the union as a whole, and
an incumbent politician of a small country in the EMU, choosing scal policy in an election year.
The key idea now is to understand whether a small country in the union can take advantage of the
fact that the central bank setting may be relatively inattentive to the small country, which can give
the scal policy maker more leeway for opportunistic behavior. In other words, a small country
adhering to a monetary union with a more conservative central banker may see their incentives
for scal opportunism increase if the common central bank is relatively inattentive to the small
countrys economic conditions.
3.2.1 The Monetary Authority - Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
The monetary policy is determined by the European central bank that has discretion over the
choice of ination. The utility of the central bank is given by the following expression:
UCB = cUt y
U
t   
 
Ut
2
2
(48)
where: Ut is a random variable with mean 
U
t and variance 
2
 ; y
U
t is the level of output of the
union; Ut is the level of ination;  is the weight of ination relative to output; and c > 0 denes
the degree of "conservativeness" of the central bank - a more "conservative" central bank has a
low c, that is, she cares relatively more about curbing ination.
As before, the aggregate supply is given by the Lucas supply curve:
 
yLt
s
= 

Lt   (et )
L

(49)
where: yUt is the aggregate level of output in the monetary union; 
U
t is the level of ination
in the monetary union; (et )
U the expected level of ination in the monetary union; and  the
elasticity of output with respect to deviations of ination from its expected level.
We assume that the central bank sets monetary policy only taking in to account the economic
situation of the larger country in the union (i = L). Thus, the central bank chooses L in order
to maximize the welfare subject to the large countrys aggregate supply relation:
max
Lt
cLt y
L
t   
 
Lt
2
2
(50)
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s:t:
 
yLt
s
= 

Lt   (et )
L

(51)
Solving this problem4 we obtain the optimal level of ination for the central bank:
Lt =
c

Lt (52)
As in the benchmark model, this expression tells us that the optimal level of ination depends
positively on the random variable or shock and on the value of c. Thus, higher levels of ination
will be optimal for a less independent (or conservative) central bank, represented by a higher value
of c. However, the central bank in the monetary union is only accommodating the shocks of the
large country, Lt .
3.2.2 The Politician
Utility Similarly to the benchmark model, it is considered that the incumbent of country i cares
about the social welfare of voters and about being in o¢ ce. The welfare of the voters is given
by a similar expression to the one of the central bank, with the only di¤erence being once again
the value of c, assumed to be equal to 1, implying that voters place more weight on output than
the central bank. As before, it is also assumed that the welfare of country is politician increases
when she is in o¢ ce and the extra welfare is represented by the parameter i > 0. Hence, the
intertemporal utility of the politician of country i is given by:
UPi = i;tyi;1   
2i;1
2
+ i + E1
(
i;tyi;2   
2i;2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
(53)
where  is the discount factor, with 0 <  < 1:
Furthermore, it is also maintained the assumption that good economic conditions in the year
of election enhance the politicians prospects of reelection, i.e. @p(yi;1)@yi;1 > 0.
Aggregate Demand The aggregate demand is given by:
ydi;t = migi;t (54)
where gt represents government expenditures of country i and mi is the scal multiplier of
country i which we, once again, assume to be positive, mi > 0:
4See algebra in section 1.1 of Appendix II
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Budget Constraint As in the benchmark model, the politician of country i determines the level
of public expenditure gi each period by choosing the level of debt di. Here, it is also maintained
the assumption that the politician can only contract debt in the rst period and it must be fully
repaid (with interest) in the next period. For simplicity, we assume that government endowment
is zero, W = 0. Hence, the level of public expenditure each period is given by:
gi;1 = di (55)
gi;2 =  (1 + ili)di (56)
where ili is the long-term interest rate on debt paid by country i.
So, similarly to the previous model, the politicians choice of the optimal amount of debt implies
a trade-o¤ between the improvement of her reelection probability and a more painful obligation to
pay.
Optimal Fiscal Policy The only scal policy instrument of country is politician is the level
of debt, thus the optimal scal policy during the election year is determined by choosing how
much debt, di, to issue. And for this decision she must take into account the trade-o¤ between the
enhancement of her reelection prospects and a more painful obligation to meet. Hence, the problem
of the incumbent politician in country i is given by the maximization of her intertemporal utility
with respect to di subject to the aggregate supply, aggregate demand and budget constraint,of
both period one and period two:
max
di
UPi = i;tyi;1   
2i;1
2
+ i + E1
(
i;tyi;2   
2i;2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
(57)
s.t. i;1 =
1

ysi;1 + 
e
i;1 (58)
i;2 =
1

ysi;2 + 
e
i;2 (59)
ysi;1 = migi;1 (60)
ysi;2 = migi;2 (61)
gi;1 = di (62)
gi;2 =  (1 + ili)di (63)
22
Solving this problem, in equilibrium, we obtain5 :
di = i;d
@p(yi;1)
@yi;1
i + i;di;1   i;d


ei;1   i;dii;2 + i;d
i

ei;2
where:
i;d =
2
mi
 
1 + (1 + ili)i
 > 0 and (64)
i = (1 + i
l
i) (65)
i;d consists of only exogenous parameters of the model and has always a positive sign. More-
over, given the parameters that it comprises, i;d can be considered as a kind of "discount factor"
in this expression.
The only endogenous parameters in the expression above of the optimal level of debt are the
levels of expected ination in the rst and second period, which are determined by the optimal
monetary policy.
Small Country Case In order to compare the optimal scal policy in the monetary union
with the optimal scal policy in the benchmark case, we now focus on the situation of a small
country in the monetary union (i = S) which is assumed to be the same country analyzed in the
previous model. With this assumption we are able to compare what drives the opportunistic PBCs
of a small country before and after adhering to the monetary union. Hence, in the expression for
a small country is given by:
dS = Sd 
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + Sd 
S
1   Sd


(e1)
S   Sd SS2 + Sd
S

(e2)
S
where:
Sd =
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
> 0 and (66)
S = (1 + iSl) (67)
It is assumed that the optimal of ination of the small country is given by the optimal level of
ination of the monetary union, St = 
U
t , which we assume to be equivalent to the optimal level
5See algebra in section 2.1 of Appendix II
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in the large country, i.e. St = 
U
t = 
L
t . So, with rational expectations, we have:
(et )
S
= E

St

= E

Lt

= E

c

Lt

=
c

E

Lt

=
c

Lt (68)
Therefore, the optimal level of debt of the Small Country is given by:
dS = Sd 
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + Sd 
S
1   Sd cL1   Sd SS2 + Sd ScL2 (69)
Comparative Statics In order to study what a¤ects the scal policy decision in a monetary
union we proceed to the analysis of how the optimal level of debt responds to changes in:
i) the sensibility of the probability of reelection with respect to output:
@dS
@
h
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
i = 2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
S > 0 (70)
This condition is the same as in the benchmark model for the small country: the higher is the
sensibility of the probability of reelection with respect to output the higher will be the level of debt.
Thus, if the probability of reelection reacts more to the economic conditions, the politician will be
more tempted to increase debt in order to enhance his prospects of being reelected. Moreover, this
e¤ect is stronger the more the politicians utility improves by being in o¢ ce, i.e. for higher values
of i. This condition supports the existence of opportunistic budget cycles also in the monetary
union model.
ii) the additional utility the politician gets for being in o¢ ce:
@dS
@S
=
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
> 0 (71)
This condition is also the same as in the benchmark model for the small country: the higher
is the extra welfare that the politician gets from being in o¢ ce the higher will be the level of debt
and so the political budget cycles will be more pronounced the more the politician benets from
being in o¢ ce.
By the two last conditions we can conclude that the political factors inuencing the scal policy
are the same in both the benchmark and the monetary union model. Therefore, the opportunistic
political budget cycles are driven by the same factors before and after the monetary union.
iii) Shock in Small Country in the First Period:
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@dS
@S1
=
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
> 0 (72)
The intuition behind this condition is given by the role of the small countrys shock in the
rst period, S1 , in the politicians intertemporal utility function. Since 
S
1 represents the impact
of output in the rst period on the intertemporal utility function, a higher value strengthens the
politicians incentives to engage in expansionary scal policies during the election year.
This condition is also the same as in the benchmark model, so the small country shocks in the
rst period have similar e¤ects on this country scal policy before and after the monetary union.
iv) Mean of the Shock:
a) Small Country in the Second Period:
@dS
@S2
=   
2S
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
< 0 (73)
Since S2 represents the impact of the second periods expected output in the politicians in-
tertemporal utility, a higher value implies a greater detrimental e¤ect of a recession in the second
period on the politicians intertemporal utility function and, consequently, a reduction of her in-
centives to raise the level of debt during an election year.
This condition is no longer the same as in the benchmark model because here it is not being
a¤ected by the degree of central bank independence. This is explained by the fact that before
the monetary union the small countrys expected shocks were also a¤ecting the expected level of
ination and so being accommodated by the central bank, whereas in the monetary union the
central bank is just responding to the shocks in the large country.
b) Large Country in the First Period:
@dS
@L1
=   
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
c < 0 (74)
Since in the monetary union the central bank is only responding to the shocks of the larger
member country, a higher value of L1 , for a given c, leads to a higher level of expected ination
in the rst period. Although this e¤ect is attenuated by having a more independent central bank
that keeps ination lower on average, it also implies that is optimal for the politician to contract
a lower level of debt to avoid further detrimental inationary pressures.
This condition is equivalent to the e¤ect of small country shock in the rst period before the
monetary union. This is, once again, explained by the fact that in the monetary union the small
countrys expected shocks are no longer inuencing the expected level of ination because the
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central bank is just accommodating the shocks in the large country.
c) Large Country in the Second Period:
@dS
@L2
=
2S
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
c > 0 (75)
A higher value of L2 , for a given c, implies a higher expected ination in the second pe-
riod, reducing the politicians intertemporal utility and strengthening the politicians incentives
to engage in expansionary policies in order to counterbalance this negative impact of ination.
Furthermore, in the presence of a less independent (or conservative) central bank, augmenting L2
implies a greater increase of expected ination in the second period, ergo scal policies even more
expansionary to attenuate the negative impact on the politicians utility.
v) the level of conservativeness (central bank independence):
@dS
@c
=   
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
L1 +
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
SL2 (76)
=
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
 
SL2   L1

(77)
The intuition behind this condition is exactly the same as the one behind the equivalent ex-
pression in the benchmark model. Hence, the politicians decision about following expansionary
or contractionary scal policies as a reaction to an increase in c depends on her expectations of
whether ination will be higher in the rst or the second period. However, here the central bank
sets monetary policy by responding only to the shocks in the large country and so the expected
ination is determined not by the mean of the shocks in the small country but by the mean of the
shocks in the large country.
We study conditions iv) and v) in further detail in section 3.3.
vi) the scal multiplier of the Small Country:
@dS
@mS
=   
2
(mS)
2
 (1 + (1 + iSl)S)


@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + S1   cL1   SS2 + ScL2

(78)
=   1
m
dS (79)
and we have that:
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@dS
@mS
< 0 i¤ d > 0 (80)
This condition is equal in the benchmark case. Hence, with a higher scal multiplier it will
be optimal for the small countrys politician to follow a not so expansionary scal policy, since an
increase in debt implies now a stronger improvement of her intertemporal utility.
vii) the elasticity of output with respect to deviations of ination from its expected level:
@dS
@
=
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)


@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + S1   cL1   SS2 + ScL2

(81)
In this case, the sigh of @d
S
@ is ambiguous because it depends on the interaction between the
political factors and the shocks. This condition is similar to the equivalent one in the benchmark
case; however, in the monetary union the shocks in the large country are also a¤ecting the sign of
this condition.
viii) the discount factor :
@dS
@
=
2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)2)
2

@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S   (1 + iSl)2
 
S1   cL1

  (1 + iSl)
 
S2   cL2

Once again, the sigh of @d
S
@ is ambiguous because it depends on the interaction between the
political factors, the shocks and the interest paid on debt. This condition is similar to the equivalent
one in the benchmark case; however, in the monetary union the shocks in the large country are
also a¤ecting the sign of this condition.
ix) the long-term interest rate on debt paid by the Small Country debt of the small is given by:
@dS
@iSl
=   2(1 + i
Sl)2
mS (1 + (1 + iSl)S)
2


@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + S1   cL1 +

1  
S
2
 
S2   cL2

The sigh of @d
@il
is also ambiguous, depending once again on the interaction between the political
factors, the shocks, the expected shocks accommodated by the central bank and the discount factor
S . This condition is also similar to the equivalent one in the benchmark case; however, in the
monetary union the shocks in the large country are also a¤ecting the sign of this condition.
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3.3 Comparing the results: Benchmark Model vs. Model of the Mone-
tary Union
The analysis of the comparative statics allows us to understand the main e¤ects determining the
politicians optimal scal policy during an election year and also to compare these e¤ects at a
country level before and after joining the monetary union. By comparing these conditions in both
models we notice that the main di¤erence between the two relies on the e¤ects of the shocks in
the second period and on the e¤ect of the central banks level of independence. Hence, in this
section we study in further detail these two e¤ects on the politicians optimal scal policy through
a graphical analysis and comparing before and after the monetary union. We rst study the
relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the optimal level of debt, and
then the inuence of the mean of the shocks in the second period on this relationship. Lastly, we
proceed to analyze the relationship between the mean of the shocks in the second period and the
optimal level of debt, and then the inuence of the degree of central bank independence on this
relationship.
3.3.1 Debt and Central Bank Independence
Here we analyze graphically the relationship between the degree of central bank independence and
the optimal level of debt, and then we compare the situation before and after the monetary union.
Benchmark Model We study rst the case of the benchmark model where the level of debt is
given by:
d = d
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Plugging this expression in a (c; d) space we have6 :
6 In this case, to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that 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Graph 3.1
The graph above shows how the degree of central bank independence (or conservativeness)
inuences the optimal level of debt contracted by the incumbent politician during the election
year. We observe that whether this inuence is positive or negative depends on the mean of the
shocks in the rst and second period. The intuition behind this result is given by the detrimental
impact of expected ination on the politicians intertemporal utility and her optimal decision to
o¤set it.
A lower level of central bank independence (or conservativeness) - i.e. higher c - represents
higher levels of ination in both periods. Thus, the politicians decision about following expan-
sionary or contractionary scal policies depends on her expectations of whether ination will be
higher in the rst or the second period. If the politician expects higher ination in the rst period
then she will contract a lower level of debt in order to avoid any further inationary pressures,
while if the expectation of ination is higher in the second period she will engage in expansionary
policies to counterbalance the negative impact of ination on her intertemporal utility. Also, these
expectations about the level of ination are based on the expectations about the shocks in both
periods and so two scenarios can occur. Firstly, we can have the case when the politician expects
the present value of the mean of the shock in the second period7 to be higher than the mean of
the shock in the rst period, i.e. 2 > 1. In this case, if we have an increase in the value of
c; ination in the second period is expected to be higher than ination in the rst period and,
therefore, it will be optimal for the politician to contract a higher level of debt to counterbalance
the negative impact of ination on her intertemporal utility. Secondly, we can have the case that
the politician expects 1 > 2 and if c increases we have 
e
1 > 
e
2. Then, in this case, it will
be optimal for the politician to choose a lower level of debt in order to avoid more inationary
7 In other words, the expected value at the year of election of the shock in the year after the election.
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pressures in the rst period. For conciseness, we analyze graphically only the rst scenario, which
is illustrated by graph 3.1.
The analysis above highlights the importance of the mean of the shocks on how the degree of
central bank independence inuences the optimal scal policy. Hence, it is interesting to analyze
how this inuence changes given a shift in the mean of the shock in the second period. Graphi-
cally, we notice that if 2 increases the curve becomes steeper and moves downwards. Graph 3.2
illustrates this change:
Graph 3.2
This graph shows that in the case where the politician expects 2 > 1, if the mean of the
shock in the second period experiments an increase from 2 to 
0
2, then it will be optimal for the
politician to contract a lower level of debt. An increase in the value of 2 a¤ects negatively the
politicians intertemporal utility via the impact of a recession and via a higher expected ination,
both in the second period. Thus, whether it is optimal for the politician to engage in contractionary
of expansionary scal policies as a response to an increase in 2 depends on which of these two
e¤ects is stronger. In other words, a higher value of 2 implies that a recession in the second
period caused by an expansionary scal policy in the year of election will be more detrimental to
politicians utility and so it will be optimal for her to choose a lower level of debt. On the other
hand, if 2 is higher, expected ination in the second period will also be higher, for a given c,
strengthening the politicians incentives to contract a higher level of debt to attenuate the negative
e¤ect of e2 on the her intertemporal utility. However, this negative e¤ect of expected ination
is reduced by having a more conservative (or independent) central bank and, consequently, the
impact of a recession in the second period is stronger. This fact is illustrated in graph 3.2 where
for values of c between zero and one it is optimal for the politician to contract a lower level of debt
as a response to an increase in 2.
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Monetary Union We now extend the analysis to the Monetary Union case, where the central
bank sets monetary policy only taking into account the situation of the large country and the
optimal level of debt for the incumbent politician in the small country is given by:
dS = Sd
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Thus, plotting this expression in a (c; dS) space we have8 :
Graph 3.3
The graph above shows how the degree of central bank independence (or conservativeness)
inuences the optimal level of debt contracted by the small countrys incumbent politician during
the election year. The intuition behind this result is exactly the same as the one behind the
equivalent one in the benchmark model. Hence, whether the politician engages in expansionary or
contractionary scal policies as a response to an increase in c depends on her expectations about
ination and we have the two possible scenarios as before. However, here the central bank is
responding only to the shocks in the large country and so the expected ination is determined not
by the mean of the shocks in the small country but by the mean of the shocks in the large country.
Once again, for this graphical analysis we only focus on the case where the politician expects
the present value of the mean of the large country shock in the second period to be higher than the
8 In this case it is assumed that SU2 > 
U
1 so that the slope is positive and that 
SS2 < 
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S + S1 so
that the intercept is also positive.
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mean of the large country shock in the rst period, i.e. SL2 > 
L
1 . Then, increasing in the value
of c implies that expected ination in the second period is higher than ination in the rst period.
Hence, it will be optimal for the politician to contract a higher level of debt to counterbalance
the negative impact of ination on her intertemporal utility - explaining the positive sign of the
curves slope in graph 3.3.
As before, it is also important to analyze how a change in the mean of the large country shock
in the second period a¤ects this result. Graphically, we notice that a increase in value of L2 only
inuences the value of the slope turning the curve steeper. Graph 3.4 illustrates this change:
Graph 3.4
We know that if L2 is higher, expected ination in the second period will also be higher, for a
given c, reducing the politicians intertemporal utility. However, a higher level of debt represents
a decrease in the expected output of the second period, attenuating the inationary pressures.
Thus, a decrease in the mean of this shock from L2 to 
L0
2 strengthens the politicians incentives to
engage in expansionary policies in order to counterbalance the negative impact of ination on her
intertemporal utility - represented graphically by the rise of d to d0. Also, in the graph we observe
that this e¤ect is smaller for lower levels of c, which can be explained by the fact that with a more
independent central bank ination is kept lower on average, reducing the politicians incentives of
compensating it with a more expansionary scal policy during the election year.
Contrarily to the benchmark case, graph 3.4 illustrates that in the monetary union an increase
of L2 always results in an increase in the optimal level debt for the small countrys politician,
independently from the degree of central independence (or conservativeness). The intuition for
this result is given by the fact that the mean of this shock here is only a¤ecting the politicians
intertemporal utility via expected ination in the second period and so it is always optimal for the
politician to counterbalance this e¤ect by contracting a higher level of debt in the election year
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without being concerned with the implications of a recession next period.
Furthermore, it is also important to analyze how in the monetary union the shocks in the small
country a¤ect the inuence of the degree of central bank independence (or conservativeness) on
the small countrys optimal scal policy and so we proceed to the graphical analysis of a change
in the mean of the small country shock in the second period. In graph 3.3 we observe that an
increase in the value of S2 decreases the value of intercept moving the curve downwards. Graph
3.5 illustrates this change:
Graph 3.5
In this graph, we observe that a higher mean of the small country shock in the second period
implies a reduction of the optimal level of debt, independently from the degree of central bank
independence. The intuition behind this result is given by the role of S2 in the politicians in-
tertemporal utility function. In the monetary union, S2 simply represents the impact of the second
periods expected output in the politicians intertemporal utility. Since in the year after the elec-
tion the politician must pay all the debt contracted in the previous period, a more expansionary
scal policy results in a lower level of output next period. Thus, if we have an increase from S2 to
S02 the greater will be the negative impact of a recession in the second period on the small country
politicians intertemporal utility function and so it will be optimal for the politician to choose a
lower level of debt - represented in the graph by the reduction from the d to d0.
Contrarily to the benchmark case, the negative impact of an increase in the mean of the shock
in the second period on the politicians intertemporal utility is not attenuated by having a more
independent (or conservative) central bank. In the monetary union, the mean of the small countrys
shocks does not inuence the expected ination because the central bank is only responding to
shocks in the large country. Therefore, a higher value of S2 does not augment the expected ination
in the second period and so the small countrys politician does not need to counterbalance the
negative impact on her utility by engaging in expansionary scal policies.
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4 Debt and Shocks
The previous analysis highlights the importance of the mean of the shocks, particularly in the
second period, in explaining the optimal level of debt for the politician during an election year.
Hence, we extend the graphical analysis to the inuence of the shocksmean in the second period
on the optimal scal policy.
Benchmark Model We study rst the case of the benchmark model where the level of debt is
given by:
d = d
@p(y1)
@y1
+ d (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1)  d (1  c) 2 (87)
where:
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Plugging this expression in a (2; d) space we have
9 :
Graph 3.6
Graph 3.6 illustrates that for higher values of the mean of the shock in the second period it is
optimal for the politician to contract a lower level of debt. However, this e¤ect is attenuated by
having a less independent (or conservative) central bank. The intuition behind this condition is
given by the role of 2 on the politicians intertemporal utility. As was previously explained, 2
9 In this case the slope is negative since it was previously assumed that 0 < c < 1. Moreover, the intercept is
positive if we assume 1 > c1   
@p(y1)
@y1
:
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a¤ects negatively the politicians intertemporal utility via two di¤erent channels - the impact of a
recession and higher expected ination, both in the second period - whether it is optimal for the
politician to engage in contractionary of expansionary scal policies as a response to an increase
in 2 depends on which of these two e¤ects is stronger. Since the negative impact of expected
ination can be reduced by having a more conservative (or independent) central bank, the impact
of a recession in the second period is necessarily stronger, explaining the negative slope of this
curve.
As we observe degree of central bank independence plays a crucial role in this relationship,
highlighting the importance of also studying of the impact of changes in c. In graph 3.6, we notice
that an increase in c moves the curve downwards and turns it atter. Graph 3.7 illustrates this
change:
Graph 3.7
In graph 3.7 we notice that the e¤ect of this change on the optimal level of debt depends on the
relationship between the mean of the shocks in the rst and second period, i.e. we observe in the
graph that given an increase in c, the optimal level of debt decreases or increases depending if 2
is greater or not than 1 . The intuition for this result is given by the inuence of ination on the
politicians intertemporal utility. A lower level of central bank independence (or conservativeness),
a higher c, represents higher levels of ination in both periods. Thus, the politicians decision about
following expansionary or contractionary scal policies depends on her expectations of whether
ination will be higher in the rst or the second period. Since these expectations about the level
of ination are based on the expectations about the shocks in both periods, we have once again
the two possible scenarios explored previously. On the one hand, we can have the case when the
politician expects the present value of the mean of the shock in the second period to be higher
than the mean of the shock in the rst period - represented in the graph by the points where
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2 >
1
 . In this case, if we have an increase in the value of c; ination in the second period is
expected to be higher than ination in the rst period and, therefore, it will be optimal for the
politician to contract a higher level of debt to counterbalance the negative impact of ination on
her intertemporal utility. On the other hand, we can also have the case that the politician expects
1 > 2 and if c increases we have 
e
1 > 
e
2. In this second case, it will be optimal for the
politician to choose a lower level of debt in order to avoid more inationary pressures in the rst
period. For conciseness, we analyze graphically only the rst scenario, which is illustrated in graph
3.7 by an increase of the optimal level of debt from d to d0.
Monetary Union In this next part, we extend this graphical analysis to the Monetary Union.
However, here we have two distinct shocks a¤ecting the optimal scal policy: the shocks of the
small country and the shocks of the large country, which we analyze separately.
Firstly, we analyze the inuence of the mean of small country shock in the second period, S2 ,
on the optimal level of debt. In this case, the optimal level of debt chosen by the small countrys
politician in the election year is given by the following expression:
dS = Sd
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Thus, plotting this expression in a (S2 ; d
S) space we have:
Graph 3.8
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Graph 3.8 shows that for higher values of the mean of the shock in the second period it is optimal
for the small countrys politician to contract a lower level of debt10 . The intuition behind this
condition is given by the role of S2 in the small country politicians intertemporal utility function.
As was previously explained, since S2 represents the impact of the second period expected output
in the small country politicians intertemporal utility, a higher value implies a greater detrimental
e¤ect of a recession in the second period on the politicians intertemporal utility function and,
consequently, a reduction of her incentives to raise the level of debt during an election year.
This result is di¤erent from the equivalent one in the benchmark model, with the main di¤erence
being the fact that this negative e¤ect of the shocks mean on the optimal level of debt is not
attenuated by having a less independent (or conservative) central bank. Hence, it is interesting to
analyze the implications in this case of change in the value of c. From graph 3.8 we notice that an
increase in c only a¤ects the value of the intercept, however, whether the curves moves upwards or
downwards depends on the expectations about the shocks in the large country. This is explained
by the fact that, here, the central bank is just accommodating the shocks in the large country and
so the expected ination is determined not by the mean of the shocks in the small country but by
the mean of the shocks in the large country. Thus, similarly to the benchmark case, two situations
are possible. On one hand, the small countrys politician expects the present value of the mean
of the large country shock in the second period to be higher than the mean of the large country
shock in the rst period, i.e. SL2 > 
L
1 , then an increase in the value of c implies that expected
ination in the second period is higher than ination in the rst period, and so a expansionary
scal policy is optimal to counterbalance the negative impact of ination. On the other hand, if c
increases and the politician expects L1 > 
SL2 , then it will be optimal to choose a lower level of
debt in order to avoid more inationary pressures in the rst period. For conciseness, we present
in graph 3.9 only the representation of the rst case with SL2 > 
L
1 , in which an increase of c to
c0 implies an increase of the optimal level of debt from d to d0:
10The slope is positive and assuming that U1 <

c
@p(yS1 )
@yS1
S +
S1
c
+ SU2 the intercept is also positive.
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Graph 3.9
Finally, we analyze the inuence of the mean of large country shock in the second period, L2 ,
on the small countrys optimal level of debt. Hence, if we plot the expression of the small countrys
optimal scal policy in a monetary union into a (L2 ; d
S) space, we obtain:
Graph 3.10
In graph 3.10 we observe that for higher values of the mean of the large country shock in the
second period it is optimal for the small countrys political to contract a lower level of debt. This
result is explained by the fact that a higher value of L2 , for a given c, implies a higher expected
ination in the second period, reducing the politicians intertemporal utility and strengthening the
politicians incentives to engage in expansionary policies in order to counterbalance this negative
impact of ination. In this case, and contrarily to the previous one, the degree of central bank
independence (or conservativeness) plays an important role in this result since in the presence
of less independent (or conservative) central bank, augmenting L2 implies a greater increase of
expected ination in the second period and so scal policies even more expansionary to attenuate
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the negative impact on the politicians utility - an e¤ect that is represented graphically by turning
the slope of the curve steeper.
Given this important role of the central banks level of independence on this result it is inter-
esting to study also here the implications of change in the value of c. In graph 3.10 we observe that
an increase in c only a¤ects both the value of the intercept and the slope, but what this implies
on the optimal scal policy depends once again on the politicians expectations about ination in
the rst or the second period. Thus, we have the exact same two scenarios as in the previous case
regarding the politicians expectations about the shocks. We analyze graphically only the rst one
where the politician expects SL2 > 
L
1 . In this case, we know that an increase in the value of c
implies that expected ination in the second period is higher than ination in the rst period and
so it is optimal for the politician to engage in a expansionary scal policy to counterbalance the
negative impact of ination on her intertemporal utility - graph 3.11 illustrates this e¤ect by the
increase of the optimal level of debt from d to d0 caused by a decrease in the degree of central bank
independence from c to c0:
Graph 3.11
In summary, the political factors inuencing the scal policy are the same in both the bench-
mark and the monetary union model. Hence, we can conclude that the opportunistic political
budget cycles are driven by the same forces before and after the monetary union. Moreover, com-
paring the results in both models we notice that the main di¤erence between the two relies on
the inuence of the shocks and the central banks level of independence on the politicians optimal
scal policy during an election year. On the one hand, we ascertain that the politicians deci-
sion about following expansionary or contractionary scal policies as a reaction to a decrease in
the central banks level of independence depends on her expectations of whether ination will be
higher in the rst or the second period. If the politician expects higher ination in the rst period
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then she will contract a lower level of debt in order to avoid any further inationary pressures,
while if the expectation of ination is higher in the second period she will engage in expansionary
policies to counterbalance the negative impact of ination on her intertemporal utility. Also, these
expectations about the level of ination are based on the expectations about the shocks in both
periods. Hence, in the monetary union the central bank sets monetary policy by responding only
to the shocks in the large country and so the expected ination is determined not by the mean of
the shocks in the small country but by the mean of the shocks in the large country.
On the other hand, the inuence of the expected shocks in the second period is considerably
di¤erent before and after the monetary union because in the latter case both the shocks of the
small and large country are a¤ecting the optimal level of debt. Firstly, in the benchmark case,
before the monetary union, an increase in the mean of the small country shock in the second
period implies a loss in the politicians intertemporal utility function both through the impact of
y2 and e2. Whether the politician attenuates this loss engaging in contractionary or expansionary
scal policies depends on which of these two e¤ects is stronger. The e¤ect via expected ination is
attenuated by having a more conservative (or independent) central bank that keeps ination lower
on average. Thus, the impact of a recession in the second period is necessarily stronger and so it
is optimal for the politician to contract a lower level of debt as a response to an increase in 2.
Finally, in the monetary union case, the mean of the small country shock in the second period,
S2 , represents the impact of the expected output in this period on the politicians intertemporal
utility. So, a higher value implies a greater detrimental e¤ect of a recession in the second period
and, consequently, a reduction of her incentives to raise the level of debt during an election year.
Whereas a higher value of the mean of the large country shock in the second period, , L2 , for a given
c, implies a higher expected ination in the second period, reducing the politicians intertemporal
utility and strengthening the politicians incentives to engage in expansionary policies in order to
counterbalance this negative impact of ination. Furthermore, in the presence of less independent
(or conservative) central bank, augmenting L2 implies a greater increase of expected ination in
the second period and so scal policies even more expansionary to attenuate the negative impact
on the politicians utility.
5 Data and Empirical Results
In this section we study empirically the e¤ects of elections on scal policy in order to support the
main ndings of our theoretical model presented in the previous section. An important feature of
the model is inuence of central bank independence (CBI) on these political budget cycles. Hence,
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we focus our empirical study on the member countries of the Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe (EMU) so that we can capture the e¤ect of this important shift in the monetary policy
on these countriesscal policy. Therefore, we consider the rst twelve countries to join the EMU
over the period 1980 to 2012: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
In the PBCs literature, the inuence of CBI on opportunistic political budget cycles was not yet
properly explored, both theoretical or empirically. There are some empirical studies that support
the existence of opportunistic PBCs in the European Union and EMU. However, these studies are
based on the early years of the EMU, which is not su¢ cient to draw denite conclusions about
the e¤ects of the change in monetary policy on the budget balances. In this study the estimation
period is extended until 2012 allowing a more reasonable comparison of the scal outcomes before
and after the entry in the EMU.
In order to study the e¤ects of elections on scal policy we use general government budget
balances as the dependent variable in this analysis. There is a wide variety of measures available
to use as a scal policy indicator, namely decits and debts, both nominal and cyclically adjusted.
The debt ratio is commonly used as a broader measure of government activities than the decit.
However, as Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) argue, government annual budgetary targets are usually
dened in ow terms (decits) rather that in stock terms (debt), mainly due to the fact that stock
variables are more a¤ected by factors outside direct control of the government than ow variables
and, therefore, are harder to target. There are also some studies that concentrate on government
budget balances excluding interest payments because these payments are not controlled by the
government and so it allows distinguishing between the automatic e¤ects of interest rate changes
on budgets and the scal policy reaction to that. However, taking into account these interest
payments can be also relevant from a PBC perspective because if these payments rise the politician
can always cut in other expenditures or be reluctant to do so in an election year (Mink and de
Haan, 2006). Moreover, it is sometimes used cyclically adjusted data since it may reduce the
simultaneity bias that could arise with the interaction of budgets and economic growth and, thus,
correcting decits for the e¤ects of the business cycles may give a better of the policy related part
of the budget. However, there is no consensus on how the cyclically adjusted budget balance should
be computed and there are often large di¤erences on the data provided by various international
organizations. Finally, there is also the question of central versus general government data. Some
studies argue that central government is the main responsible for scal changes. On the other
hand, general government has a wider coverage and is most relevant concept in the context of the
European Union scal policy framework.
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Therefore, taking in to account all these considerations we report only in this study the main
ndings using nominal general government budget balance as the dependent variable. However, the
same analysis was also done using general government primary budget balance and debt growth
rate as dependent variables. The main results obtained are in essence very similar to the ones
focused on budget balance and are presented in sections 1 and 2 of appendix IV. The data set
for these variables was obtained from the European Commission Ameco and the complete variable
description is presented in appendix III.
The theoretical model suggested that the optimal scal policy depends on the fact that there
is an election that year, on the extra welfare that the politician gets from being in o¢ ce, on the
central bank level of independence and on shocks. Therefore, to capture these e¤ects we consider as
explanatory variables: (1) an electoral dummy, denoted Election, which takes the value 1 in election
years and zero otherwise; (2) a corruption index, denoted Corruption, as a proxy for the extra
welfare that the politician earns for being in o¢ ce, so that for a more corrupt country this extra
welfare is considered to be higher; (3) an index of central bank independence, denoted CBI ; and,
nally, to measure the scal responsiveness to macroeconomic conditions we use (4) the output gap
as a proxy for the business cycle. Anti-cyclical policies are commonly followed in order to stabilize
the economic growth around potential and, therefore, scal responses to recessions or booms are
generally opposite: in recessions, governments tend to pursue expansionary policies to stimulate
the economy, while during an economic boom contractionary scal policies help dampening cyclical
upswings and control the inationary pressures. Hence, we introduce this last explanatory variable
to lter these automatic stabilization e¤ects from our scal policy. We use two indicators for
output gap: one based on potential GDP (denoted Output Gap) and other based on trend GDP
(denoted Output Gaptrend), both computed by the European Commission11 . However, since the
main results are basically the same using either one of the indicators, we only present in the main
text the results with the output gap based on potential GDP and we present the results with the
output gap based on trend output in section 3 of appendix IV. Furthermore, for this same purpose
we also use real GDP growth instead of output gap as explanatory variable, but since the main
results are practically identical we present them in section 4 of appendix IV for conciseness.
In summary, we want to nd evidence that supports the existence of opportunistic political
business cycles while also analyzing how central bank independence inuences these cycles. Thus,
11According to list of variables from the European Commission Ameco (p.45) The estimates for the out-
put trend, the DG ECFIN cyclical adjustment method applies the Hodrick-Prescott lter to the actual out-
put series. The Hodrick-Prescott lter minimizes the sum of squared deviations of actual output around
its trend subject to a constraint on the variation of the growth rate of trend output. The lter ap-
plies weighted moving averages to the actual output series to obtain trend GDP estimates - rather than
a simple arithmetic moving average - and therefore it allows for a better ltering of actual output data
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_nance/db_indicators/ameco/documents/list_of_variables.pdf).
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we study rst the twelve countries over the period 1980 to 2012 and then before and after EMU
in order to understand the actual inuence of the central bank independence.
Firstly, to motivate this empirical analysis we show in Graph 1 some indicative evidence for
the existence of PBCs in the twelve countries of the euro area. Graph 1 presents an overview of
the general government budget balances as percentage of GDP during 1980-2012:
We can observe that all the 12 countries, with the exception of Ireland, have on average lower
budget balances during election years than on the years without a parliamentary election. The
(unweighted) average budget balance for all the election years in the sample equals -3.94%, whereas
for non-election years it is -3.23%. That is, on average the budget balance is 0.71 percentage points
lower during an election year which could indicate some opportunistic manipulation of scal policy
for electoral purposes. However, in order to draw more compelling conclusions regarding the
political budget cycles in the EMU, it should be constructed a model that takes into account other
relevant determinants of the budget balance in line with the model hypothesis proposed in the
previous section.
Therefore, to motivate the choice of Corruption and CBI as explanatory variables we present
Graphs 2 and 3 that show the relationship between the government budget balance and corruption
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and central bank independence, respectively. In graph 2 the indicator used for corruption was
the corruption index of the International Country Risk Guide 1984-2006 which ranges from 0 to 6
(0 being the highest level of corruption and 6 the lowest). Thus, here a country is considered as
more corrupt if the average of its corruption index is below the average of twelve countries (4.7).
Moreover, a country is considered to have a high decit if the average value of the budget balance is
below the average of the twelve countries (-3.44). In this graph we can distinguish a positive trend
between the index of corruption and the budget balances, i.e. the less corrupt countries present
better budget balances. Moreover, it is important to notice that the majority of high corruption
countries also present high decits, namely Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Belgium.
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In Graph 3 the indicator used for central bank independence (CBI) was computed by Crowe
and Meade (2007), and based on the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), which ranges from 0
to 1 (0 being the lowest level of CBI and 1 the highest). Thus, a country is considered as having
a more independent central bank if its average CBI index is below the average of twelve countries
(0.4).
In the next section we present and analyze the estimations results of the model where the
estimates are based on pooled Least Squares12 . The estimation period is 1980-2012, but shorted
for some countries and for some explanatory variables reecting the availability of the data. For
comparative purposes we also estimate the model for the period before and after the creation of the
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, 1980-1998 and 1999-2012, respectively. All estimations
include country- and year-dummies13 , but the coe¢ cients are not shown in the tables. Sources
and descriptions of the data used are included in appendix III
5.1 Results for Government Budget Balances
In this section we study the empirical evidence of opportunistic political business cycles in the
twelve countries of the EMU using nominal general government budget balance as the scal policy
indicator. Firstly, we present the analysis for the overall sample period from 1980 to 2012. Secondly,
we compare these results with the results before and after EMU.
12The usual estimation method used in PBCs studies. See, for example, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1992) or
Tujula and Wolswijk (2004). However, estimates based on Fixed and Random E¤ects were also computed and are
in line with the ones based on pooled Least Squares (see section 5 of appendix VI).
13Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) motivate the inclusion of country- and year-dummies.
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5.1.1 All Years: 1980-2012
In Table 1 we present the estimation results with budget balance as dependent variable during the
period of 1980-2012. In column (1) we have the results including only e¤ects of the business cycle,
that is, the output gap computed as the gap between the actual GDP and the Potential GDP
(denoted by Output Gap). We obtain that an economic upswing improves the budget balance,
i.e. lowers the budget decit. Note that this variable is highly signicant and suggests that each
percentage point increase in the output gap rises the net lending relative to GDP by more than
0.4 percentage points.
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In order to test the hypothesis suggested by the model that the decit is lower with a more
independent central bank, in column (2) we add to the regression the explanatory variable CBI,
consisting of a central bank independence index which ranges between 0 and 1 (1 being the highest
level of central bank independence). We obtain that an increase in the level of central bank
independence improves the budget balances, i.e. lowers the decit, which supports the hypothesis
of our model. This variable is also highly signicant14 .
In the model we have that the level of government decit depends positively on the extra welfare
that the politician gains from being in o¢ ce. In order to test this hypothesis empirically we use
the corruption index as proxy for the politicians extra welfare. Thus, in column (3) we add the
symmetric of this index (denoted by Corruption) as explanatory variable which ranges from -6 to 0
(-6 being the less corrupt). However, the results obtained are not satisfactory since the coe¢ cient
is not signicant and its sign is not in line with the predictions of the model.
Moreover, in column (4) we introduce the political the variable of our model, the Election
dummy, which takes the value 1 in election years and zero otherwise. With this variable we intend
to test the most important hypothesis of our model which states that politicians manipulate scal
policies during election years in order to enhance their prospects of being re-elected. We obtain
that the e¤ect of elections on budget decits is signicant both statistically and economically. That
is, the estimated coe¢ cient of Election implies that budget balances will be lower in election years
by more than 0.6 percent of GDP.
Finally, we add the dummy Euro in column (5) which takes value 1 when the countries have
adopted the euro as their common currency and zero otherwise. With this variable we aim to
control for the e¤ects of entering the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. This variable is
highly signicant and presents a negative coe¢ cient suggesting that after joining the EMU the
budget balances of the countries have deteriorated, i.e. with euro has their common currency
budget balance relative to GDP decreases by around 5 percentage points.
In column (5) we have the complete model and we observe that every explanatory variable
is signicant, even Corruption, while maintaining the sign of the coe¢ cients described above.
Therefore, these results not only provide relevant empirical evidence of political business cycles in
the twelve countries of EMU, but also support the important hypothesis of our model which states
that central bank independence also may inuence these cycles.
Furthermore, other important result to analyze is the signicance of the country-and year-
dummies which are not reported in the table. In graphs 4 and 5 we present the coe¢ cients of these
14This result suggests that one point increase in the central bank independence index improves the budget balance
relative to GDP by around 3.3 percentage points.
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dummies.
In graph 4 we observe that all the country-dummies have negative and signicant coe¢ cients,
with the exception of Finland. Moreover, it is also relevant to notice that the countries presenting
the highest coe¢ cients in absolute value are Greece, Italy and Portugal. On the other hand,
in graph 5 we have that only the year-dummies after 1997 are signicant and all have positive
coe¢ cients.
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We extended this analysis by adding two types of interaction variables. First, we introduce the
interaction variables computed as the interaction between the main variables of interest and the
dummy variable Euro: euroElection, euroCorruption and EuroCBI. With these terms we intend to
control for the specic e¤ect of the variables of interest after the creation of the EMU. However, the
results obtained were not satisfactory since none of these variables presented a signicant coe¢ cient.
Moreover, when any one of these variables is included in the model the dummy Election no longer
presents a signicant coe¢ cient. A second type of interaction variables was also included in the
model and they were computed as the interaction between the main variables of interest and the
dummy Election: ElectCorruption and ElectCBI. These terms aim to control for the specic e¤ects
of the variables of interest during election years. However, the results obtained were once again
not satisfactory for the exact same reasons as with the Euro interaction variables. Thus, the model
with these groups of interaction variables does not support the existence of political budget cycles
and the estimation results are presented in section 6 of appendix IV.
In order to understand the role and the importance of the inclusion of country- and year-
dummies in Table 2 we present the estimation results of Table 1s equation (5) with and without
country- and year-dummies.
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Fiscal outcomes are inuenced by macroeconomic shocks that tend to be highly correlated
across countries. Hence, as argued by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), year-dummies can parcel
out the e¤ects of these shocks if they are only partially captured by the macroeconomic explanatory
variables (Output Gap in this case). Moreover, political and institutional variables  as CBI,
Corruption and Election are generally highly correlated with unobservable and time-invariant
cultural and historical country-specic characteristics. Therefore, it is extremely important to
include country-dummies in order to control for the country xed e¤ects.
In column (1) we have the results for equation (5) as in Table 1, with country- and year-
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dummies. In column (2) only the country-dummies are included and we obtain almost the same
results as in column (1), with the exception of the Euro dummy that in this case is not signicant.
On the other hand, in column (3) we present the estimation results only including year-dummies
and in this case they are slightly di¤erent from the results in with the also the country-dummies: no
major change in the coe¢ cient of Output Gap, which is still positive and signicant but presenting
a lower value; the coe¢ cient of CBI is still positive but no longer signicant; the coe¢ cient
of Corruption in this case is negative and highly signicant  hence, in this model the level of
corruption a¤ects negatively the budget balance, i.e. a more corrupt country presents lower budget
balances, which is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model; the dummy Election presents
once again a negative and signicant coe¢ cient, but in this case much higher in absolute value; at
last, the coe¢ cient of the dummy Euro is still signicant but positive. Finally, in column (4) we
present the estimation results without both country and year dummies and in this case we obtain
almost the same results as with only the year-dummies.
In summary, the model with and without country- and year-dummies always support the exis-
tence of PBCs in the twelve EMU member countries over the period 1980-2012 since the dummy
Election always presents a negative and signicant coe¢ cient. However, how the explanatory vari-
ables a¤ect the budget cycles depend on the inclusion of these dummies, especially the country-
dummies since the most relevant di¤erences occur when they are not inserted in the model.
5.1.2 Comparing the Estimation Results: all Years, before and after EMU
In Table 3 we compare the results obtained for the model mentioned above but for di¤erent sample
periods: during 1980-2012, before joining the EMU (1980-1999) and after joining the EMU. In
column (1) we present the model above, with the ve explanatory variables and for the period
1980-2012.
51
The results of the model before the EMU are presented in column (2)  in this case is not
necessary to include the Euro dummy. We obtain that the output gap still has a positive and
signicant impact on the budget balances, i.e. each percentage point increase in the output gap
rises the net lending relative to GDP by around 0.9 percentage points. In this model the variable
CBI is omitted due to collinearity and Corruption maintains a positive and signicant coe¢ cient,
although higher in absolute value. An important result is the fact that the dummy Election is not
signicant here and, therefore, we do not nd empirical evidence of PBCs in these twelve countries
before joining the EMU.
On the other hand, we obtain that these political budget cycles are strongly present after the
creation of the EMU, as we can observe in the results of column (3). In this model the dummy
Euro is once again not included and we only obtain satisfactory results for the political variable:
the dummy Election is highly signicant and suggests that budget balances will be lower in election
years by more than 0.8 percent of GDP a higher value than the one obtained for 1980-2012.
In order to understand the inuence of Germany on the other country membersbudget cycles
we extend the analysis by including two more variables: Weight, computed as the percentage of the
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countrys real GDP relative to Germanys GDP; and Germanys Output Gap (denoted by GER
Output Gap) to capture the inuence of Germany business cycles. Table 4 presents the model
including these two variables.
In column (1) we have the model for the period 1980-2012 and the results obtained are practi-
cally the same as in Table 3. However, in this case the variable Corruption and the two variables
included do not present signicant coe¢ cients. The results for before the EMU are presented in
column (2) and are very similar to the ones in Table 1. However, we have also that Germanys
output gap inuences negatively the budget balances of the member countries. Finally, in column
(3) we present the results for after the EMU and we have that both Weight and Germany Output
Gap present positive and highly signicant coe¢ cients. Moreover, the dummy Election maintains
a negative and signicant coe¢ cient supporting once again the existence of PBCs after the EMU.
It is also important to notice that during this period only the business cycles in Germany are af-
fecting positively the budget balances, while before they were only a¤ected positively by countrys
business cycles.
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Furthermore, other important result to analyze is the signicance of the country-dummies which
are not reported in the table. In graph 6 we present the coe¢ cients of these dummies. In this case,
we observe that almost every country-dummy present a negative coe¢ cient, with the exception of
Finland, France and Germany. Moreover, it is also relevant to notice that not all the coe¢ cients
present a signicant coe¢ cient but larger ones in absolute value - Greece and Portugal - do.
54
Similarly to what was done in the last section, we extended this analysis by adding the two
types of interaction variables: euroElection, euroCorruption and EuroCBI, and ElectCorruption
and ElectCBI. However, the results obtained were not satisfactory since none of these variables
presented a signicant coe¢ cient. Moreover, when any one of these variables is included in the
model the dummy Election no longer presents a signicant coe¢ cient. Thus, the model with these
groups of interaction variables does not support the existence of political budget cycles section
2 of appendix IV presents these estimation results.
For comparison purposes, in Tables 5 and 6 we present the estimation results of Table 4 without
country- and year-dummies, respectively.
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Table 5 presents the same estimation results as Table 4 but without country-dummies and
observe relevant di¤erences between the two. In column (1) we have that: CBI is no longer
signicant; Corruption presents here a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient and, therefore,
in line with the hypothesis of the theoretical model that more corrupt countries incur in higher
decits; lastly, the Euro dummy is once again signicant but here presents a positive coe¢ cient.
The estimation results before the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe without the country-
dummies are presented in column (2) and these are also di¤erent from the ones of Table 4. In
this case, the only variable with satisfactory results is Corruption that, contrarily to the case of
Table 4, presents positive and highly signicant coe¢ cient. Moreover, when country-dummies
are not included CBI is not omitted due to collinearity before the EMU but does not present a
signicant coe¢ cient. Finally, in column (3) we have the estimation results after EMU which once
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again are extremely di¤erent from the ones with country-dummies included. In this case, both
Output Gap and Corruption are signicant while GER Output Gap no longer presents a signicant
coe¢ cient. Moreover, although the variable Weight is still signicant, here it presents the inverse
sign meaning being a large economy relatively to Germany after the EMU no longer improves the
budget balances.
Briey, the estimation results change signicantly when country-dummies are not included in
the estimation particularly in what concerns the inuence on budget balances of Corruption and
the German economy. However, it does not changes the e¤ects of elections on the scal outcomes
since the dummy Election presents in both a negative and signicant coe¢ cient over the period
1980-2012 and after the EMU.
In conclusion, with this model we nd empirical evidence of opportunistic budget cycles in
twelve countries of the EMU - particularly after the countries have joined this common currency
area - using general government budget balance as the scal policy indicator. We also concluded
that central bank independence inuences positively the scal policy, as was predicted in the
theoretical model. Moreover, In addition, we obtain that Germany´s economic cycle plays a crucial
role in individual country budget balances only after the adoption of the common currency. Also,
the smaller the size of a country´s economy relative to that of Germany, the larger partner in the
monetary union, the more scal policy-makers tend to indulge in budget decits. Therefore, these
results provide an important empirical support to the model options presented in the previous
section.
6 Conclusion
We study the inuence of CBI on opportunistic political budget cycles at both a theoretical and an
empirical level. We construct a model inspired in the setting of Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe (EMU) to capture the interplay between a shift of the level of Central Bank Independence
on how the scal policy is set at the country level, before electoral periods. Firstly, we focus
on the situation before the EMU and we present a model of opportunistic budget cycles with
an independent central bank. The aim of the model is to understand what is driving political
budget cycles in the presence of a central bank with varying degrees of independence. We nd
that the opportunistic PBCs are driven by two main reasons: the fact that the politicians welfare
increases by being in o¢ ce and the fact that good economic conditions in the year of election
enhance the politicians prospects of reelection. We obtain that in case where each country has
their own central bank it will be optimal for the politician to conduct expansionary scal policy
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during electoral periods in the presence of a central bank with a lower level of independence.
In the second part, we extend the model to the setting of a monetary union, as in EMU, where
monetary and scal policies are determined by two distinct authorities: a common central bank
that sets monetary policy responding to the economic situation of the union as a whole, and an
incumbent politician in a small country choosing scal policy in an election year. The key idea
of this second model is to determine whether and how small countries in the union might take
advantage of the fact that the one central bank may overlook the specic economic conditions of
the small country, thus conducting opportunistic expansionary scal policies in electoral periods.
We obtain that the political budget cycles in the EMU are driven by the same factors as in the
benchmark model. However, the main di¤erence lies on how the central bank independence level
inuences these PBCs. In the benchmark model the central bank is reacting only to the shocks
of the small country, whereas in the EMU it is reacting to the shocks of the Union or, as was
assumed, to the shocks of the Large Country.
Furthermore, we were able to support empirically the main ndings of our models through the
study of twelve countries of EMU over the period 1980 to 2012. Using the general government
budget balance as the scal policy indicator, we nd empirical evidence of opportunistic PBCs,
particularly after the countries have joined EMU. We also conclude that central bank independence
inuences positively scal policy - encouraging surpluses - as predicted in the theoretical model.
In addition, we obtain that Germany´s economic cycle plays a crucial role in individual country
budget balances only after the adoption of the common currency. Also, the smaller the size of
a country´s economy relative to that of Germany, the larger partner in the monetary union, the
more scal policy-makers tend to indulge in budget decits. We interpret our results as suggestive
of the line of research and the model options proposed in this thesis.
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Appendix I
Benchmark Model - One Country One Central Bank
1. The Monetary Authority
1.1 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
The central bank is assumed to choose  in order to maximize the period losses subject to the
aggregate supply relation. Thus, the problem of the Central Bank at each period is given by:
max
t
ctyt   
2t
2
(92)
s:t: yst =  (t   et ) (93)
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The rst order condition is:
@LCB
@t
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t  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2. Optimal Fiscal Policy
2.1 The Problem of the Politician
The desired scal policy of the incumbent is given by the maximization of her utility with respect
to d subject to the aggregate supply, aggregate demand and government budget constraint:
max
d
UP = 1y1   
21
2
+ + E1

2y2   
22
2
+ p(y1)

(97)
s.t. 1 =
1

ys1 + 
e
1 (98)
2 =
1

ys2 + 
e
2 (99)
yd1 = mg1 (100)
yd2 = mg2 (101)
g1 = d (102)
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Substituting the government budget constraint into the aggregate demand we obtain:
max
d
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1y1   
21
2
+ + E1

2y2   
22
2
+ p(y1)

(104)
s.t. 1 =
1

ys1 + 
e
1 (105)
2 =
1

ys2 + 
e
2 (106)
yd1 = md (107)
yd2 =  (1 + il)md (108)
In equilibrium ys = yd we have:
max
d
UP = 1y1   
21
2
+ + E1

2y2   
22
2
+ p(y1)

(109)
s.t. 1 =
1

md+ e1 (110)
2 =  
1

(1 + il)md+ e2 (111)
y1 = md (112)
y2 =  (1 + il)md (113)
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, the incumbents problem becomes:
max
d
UP = 1md 

1
md+ 
e
1
2
2
++E1
(
2

 (1 + il)md

  

  1 (1 + i
l)md+ e2
2
2
+ p(y1)
)
(114)
The rst order conditions:
d :
@UP
@d
= 0,
, 1m  
1

m

1

md+ e1

+ E1

 (1 + il)m2 +
1

(1 + il)m

  1

(1 + il)md+ e2

+
@p(y1)
@y1
@y1
@d


= 0
, 1   
1
2
md   1

e1 + E1

 (1 + il)2  
1
2
(1 + il)2md+
1

(1 + il)e2 +
@p(y1)
@y1


= 0
, d = 
2
m [1 + (1 + il)2]


@p(y1)
@y1
+ 1  


e1   (1 + il)2 +


(1 + il)e2

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Appendix II
Opportunistic Budget Cycles in the European Monetary Union
1. The Monetary Authority
1.1 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
The central bank is assumed to choose  in order to minimize the period losses subject to the
aggregate supply relation. Thus, the problem of the Central Bank at each period is given by:
max
t
cUt y
U
t   
 
Ut
2
2
(115)
s:t:
 
yUt
s
= 

Ut   (et )
U

(116)
max
t
cUt
h


Ut   (et )
U
i
  
 
Ut
2
2
(117)
The rst order condition is:
@LCB
@Ut
= cUt   Ut = 0, (118)
, Ut =
c

Ut (119)
2. Optimal Fiscal Policy
2.1 The Problem of the Politician
The desired scal policy of the incumbent is given by the maximization of her utility with respect
to di subject to the aggregate supply, aggregate demand and government budget constraint:
max
di
UPi = i;tyi;1   
2i;1
2
+ i + E1
(
i;tyi;2   
2i;2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
(120)
s.t. i;1 =
1

ysi;1 + 
e
i;1 (121)
i;2 =
1

ysi;2 + 
e
i;2 (122)
ysi;1 = migi;1 (123)
ysi;2 = migi;2 (124)
gi;1 = di (125)
gi;2 =  (1 + ili)di (126)
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ubstituting the government budget constraint into the aggregate demand we obtain:
max
di
UPi = i;tyi;1   
2i;1
2
+ i + E1
(
i;tyi;2   
2i;2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
(127)
s.t. i;1 =
1

ysi;1 + 
e
i;1 (128)
i;2 =
1

ysi;2 + 
e
i;2 (129)
ysi;1 = midi (130)
ysi;2 =  mi(1 + ili)di (131)
In equilibrium ys = yd we have:
max
di
UPi = i;tyi;1   
2i;1
2
+ i + E1
(
i;tyi;2   
2i;2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
(132)
s.t. i;1 =
1

midi + 
e
i;1 (133)
i;2 =  
1

mi(1 + i
l
i)di + 
e
i;2 (134)
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, the incumbents problem becomes:
max
di
UPi = i;1midi 

1
midi + 
e
i;1
2
2
+i+E1
(
i;2

 (1 + il)midi

  

  1 (1 + i
l)midi + 
e
i;2
2
2
+ p(yi;1)i
)
The rst order conditions:
di :
@UPi
@d
= 0
, i;1   
1
2
midi   
1

ei;1 + E1

 (1 + ili)i;2  
1
2
(1 + ili)
2midi +
1

(1 + ili)
e
i;2 +
@p(yi;1)
@yi;1
i

= 0
, di =
2
mi

1 + (1 + ili)
2
  @p(yi;1)
@yi;1
i + i;1  


ei;1   (1 + ili)i;2 +


(1 + ili)
e
i;2

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Appendix III
Denitions and sources of the data
Budget Balance
General government net borrowing / net lending as % of GDP. Data have been corrected for
one-o¤ UMTS receipts.
Unit: Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive decit procedure).
Source: the European Commission Ameco.
Output Gap
Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at constant market prices.
Unit: Percentage of potential gross domestic product at market prices.
Source: the European Commission Ameco.
CBI
Central bank independence index computed by Crowe and Meade (2007) and based on the
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) index (CWN index). The CWN index has four components:
appointment procedures for the head of the central bank; the resolution of conict between the
central bank and the executive branch of government; the use of an explicit policy target; and rules
limiting lending to government.
Unit: 0 to 1 points (0 being the lowest level of CBI and 1 the highest).
Source: Data used in Crowe and Meade (2007).
Corruption
The symmetric of the International Country Risk Guide Corruption index over the period from
1984 to 2006.
Unit: -6 to 0 points, 0 points being the maximum level perceived of corruption and -6 the
lowest.
Source: the PRS Group.
Election
Dummy with value 1 in years in which parliamentary elections have taken place
Source: IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout).
Euro
Dummy taking value 1 in 1999-2012, and 0 otherwise (except for Greece, taking value 1 in
2001-2012, and 0 otherwise).
Weight
The countrys real gross domestic product as a percentage of Germanys real GDP.
Unit: Percentage.
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GER Output Gap
Output gap in Germany computed as the gap between actual and potential gross domestic
product at constant market prices.
Unit: Percentage of potential gross domestic product at market prices.
Source: the European Commission Ameco.
Primary Budget Balance (Primary BB)
General government net borrowing / net lending excluding interest as % of GDP. Data have
been corrected for one-o¤ UMTS receipts.
Unit: Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive decit procedure).
Source: the European Commission Ameco.
Debt
General government consolidated gross debt as % of GDP.
Unit: Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive decit procedure).
Source: the European Commission Ameco.
Debt GR
Annual growth rate of the general government consolidated gross debt as % of GDP.
Unit: Percentage.
Output GapTrend
Gap between actual and trend gross domestic product at constant market prices. To obtain
estimates for the output trend, the cyclical adjustment method applies the Hodrick-Prescott lter
to the actual output series.
Unit: Percentage of trend gross domestic product at market prices.
Source: European Commission Ameco.
Real GDP growth
Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product at constant market prices.
Unit: Percentage.
Source: the OECD Economic Outlook database and the European Commission Ameco.
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Appendix IV
1. Estimation Results with Primary Budget Balance as Dependent Variable
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012
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Table 2 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 Comparing with and without country
and year-dummies
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Table 3 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU
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Table 4 Estimation Results: All years, before EMU and after EMU
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Table 5 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU without
country-dummies
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2. Estimation Results with Debt Growth Rate as Dependent Variable
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012
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Table 2 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 Comparing with and without country
and year-dummies
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Table 3 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU
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Table 4 Estimation Results: All years, before EMU and after EMU with Weight
and Germany Output Gap
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Table 5 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU without
country-dummies
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3. Estimation Results with Output Gap based on trend GDP
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012
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Table 2 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 Comparing with and without country
and year-dummies
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Table 3 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU
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Table 4 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU with Weight
and Germany Output Gap
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Table 5 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU without
country-dummies
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4. Estimation Results with real GDP growth rate
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012
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Table 2 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 Comparing with and without country
and year-dummies
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Table 3 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU
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Table 4 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU with Weight
and Germany Output Gap
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Table 5 Estimation Results: All years, Before EMU and After EMU without
country-dummies
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5. Estimation Results: Pooled Least Squares, Fixed E¤ects and Random E¤ects
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012
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6. Estimation Results including the Interaction Variables
Table 1 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 with EURO Interaction Variables
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Table 2 Estimation Results: 1980-2012 with ELECTION Interaction Variables
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